



COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

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March 6, 2025

The Honorable Glenn Youngkin
Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia
1111 Broad Street
Richmond, VA 23219

**RE: 2024 Annual Status of Safety Report and Rail Fixed Guideway State Safety Oversight
Program Performance in the Commonwealth of Virginia**


Dear Governor Youngkin,

49 U.S. Code § 5329(e)(4) and 49 CFR Part 674.13(a)(7) mandate that at least once a year, the State Safety Oversight Agency reports the status of the safety of each rail fixed guideway public transportation system to the Governor. As such, the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) submits this annual status of safety report for Hampton Roads Transit's Tide light rail system for the period January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024.

The attached report outlines the program's mission and describes its current activities, while detailing ongoing efforts to comply with the federal regulation on State Safety Oversight of Rail Fixed Guideway Systems.

Please do not hesitate to contact me or the DRPT Transit Rail Safety and Emergency Management Administrator, Andrew Ennis (andrew.ennis@drpt.virginia.gov), should you or your staff members have questions or wish to discuss the program.

Sincerely,

Signed by:

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Tiffany Robinson

Cc: W. Sheppard Miller, Secretary of Transportation
Andrew Ennis, DRPT



February 2025

2024 Annual Status of Safety Report

Rail Fixed Guideway State Safety Oversight Program

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Executive Summary

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) is the designated Rail State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) for the Commonwealth of Virginia. In this role, DRPT oversees the Hampton Roads Transit (HRT) Tide light rail system in Norfolk. The state safety oversight agency's mission is the continuous verification that HRT is carrying out its documented programs to ensure the safety of its passengers and employees.

The Transit Rail Safety and Emergency Management Administrator oversees DRPT's oversight program with support from contracted consultant staff who are experts in fields such as train signaling, civil engineering, and rail operations. The budget for the state safety oversight program is funded by Federal Transit Administration (FTA) dedicated formula grants that are matched with dedicated funding from the Commonwealth Mass Transit Fund.

In its oversight role, DRPT:

- Conducts audits and inspections (both announced and unannounced) of the Tide system
- Reviews and adopts accident, incident, and hazard investigations
- Tracks and verifies HRT's progress in correcting safety and security gaps on its light rail system

2024 Program Highlights

Approved Documents

DRPT formally approved HRT's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), Version 5 on December 19, 2024, as well as HRT's Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) Version 8.2 on August 29, 2024.

Triennial Audits

- March: HRT's Rail Transportation.
- October: HRT's Rail Training.

Inspections

Month	Activity
January	Station Tactile Warning Strip Conditions
March	Station Conditions, Operations Rules Compliance & Norfolk Tide Facility (NTF) shop
June	Station Conditions
July	Operations Rule Compliance, Track Conditions
October	Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) Event Verification
December	Drug & Alcohol Program

Accident Notifications and Investigations

In 2024, there were several reportable events including five collisions involving light rail vehicles and POVs; two collisions with objects; one elevator entrapment; three signal violations at grade crossings and several service disruptions. All reportable events were properly investigated and adopted by DRPT SSO.

FTA Triennial Audit of DRPT SSO Program

Between June 3 to 5, 2024, the FTA conducted its triennial audit of the DRPT State Safety Oversight (SSO) program. DRPT submitted all requested documents and participated in on-site audit activities, including interviews and field inspections of the HRT Tide system. The FTA issued its final report to DRPT on October 10, 2024, with the following findings identified:

1. Finding 1: DRPT did not demonstrate its employees, and other personnel are qualified to perform their functions.
 - a. **DRPT SSO Response:** DRPT employees and contractual personnel are qualified to perform their functions, as demonstrated through DRPT's annual submission of its technical training plan (TTP) through the FTA's state safety oversight reporting (SSOR) online tool, as well as through individuals' Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP) certificates
2. Finding 2: DRPT does not electronically submit an annual report with all the requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 674.39(a) to FTA by March 15 or the new deadline if FTA issues an extension.
 - a. **DRPT SSO Response:** DRPT will update Section 1.5 in Revision 17 of its Safety and Security Program Standard and Procedures (SSPS). In this section of the SSPS, DRPT will remove the outdated legal and financial code references identified during the FTA audit. DRPT will upload Revision 17 its SSPS to the State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) online tool by the March 15, 2025, deadline.

At the time of this report, DRPT has generated proposed corrective actions to address these findings in the timeframes prescribed by the FTA and awaits FTA's approval.

Federal Regulatory Compliance

The FTA issued Special Directive 22-49 to DRPT in October 2022, which required the development and implementation of a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) program. DRPT SSOA submitted its RBI development plan in October, meeting the special directive deadline. The FTA formally certified DRPT's RBI program on December 4, 2024.

In 2024 the FTA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for 49 CFR Part 671: Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection with a public comment period from March 25, 2024, to May 24, 2024. Additionally, the FTA published revisions to 49 CFR Parts 672, 673 and 674 throughout 2024. Details of these revisions, as well as DRPT's engagement with HRT and compliance with the updated regulations can be found in the Federal and State Legislative Changes section of this report.

Program Background and Overview

In 1996, FTA issued the Rail Fixed Guideway Systems State Safety Oversight Rule, 49 CFR Part 659. Under this rule, each state with rail fixed guideway systems not subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal Railroad Administration is responsible for overseeing the safety and security program implementation of these systems. Pursuant to Subdivision 16 of § 33.2-285 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia's designated SSOA is DRPT. DRPT oversees the HRT Tide light rail system in Norfolk, Virginia.

The FTA certified DRPT's State Safety Oversight (SSO) program under 49 CFR Part 674 on April 4, 2018. This regulation directs eligible states to significantly strengthen their authority to oversee and enforce safety requirements to prevent and mitigate accidents and incidents on rail fixed guideway systems subject to oversight. Additionally, it mandates eligible states to demonstrate legal and financial independence from these rail transit systems, as well as provide the necessary financial and human resources for overseeing the number, size, and complexity of rail transit systems within their jurisdictions. While the regulation does not mandate oversight of security practices at the rail transit system, DRPT maintains this authority over HRT security and emergency preparedness programs as authorized by the Code of Virginia. This report details State Safety Oversight activities at the HRT Tide light rail system¹ from January 1 through December 31, 2024.

State Safety Oversight Responsibilities

DRPT's SSO program activities are intended to ensure that a rail transit agency (RTA) places safety considerations over operational expediency in all decision making. An important distinction should be made in delineating the role of the SSOA versus the role of the RTA in maintaining and improving rail safety. The SSOA's role is that of the regulator ensuring that all the mechanisms in place at the RTA are sound and unconditionally applied. The state does not perform day-to-day functions at the RTA. Alternatively, the RTA's role is to perform all necessary programmatic, procedural, technical, engineering, and operational activities that it has formally adopted to maintain safety in rail operations.

DRPT's oversight mission is to continuously verify that the RTA is carrying out its documented programs to ensure the safety of its passengers and employees. DRPT's oversight efforts are fully transparent to HRT. All DRPT's actions, including those that denote various deficiencies at HRT, are communicated objectively with the goal of improving HRT's rail safety posture and without assigning fault. Although HRT's Safety and Security Departments are the custodians of HRT's safety and security programs, the entire organization, including its senior executives, middle managers, supervisors, and frontline personnel, is empowered and responsible for upholding its safety goals.

The entirety of this oversight effort is called the "Program." The activities of the DRPT oversight program are described in a document titled the Safety and Security Program Standard (SSPS). As mandated by federal regulation, the SSPS contains a description of DRPT's organizational structure and lines of authority that support the oversight program. It also lists DRPT's protocols

¹ An interstate compact was enacted on August 22, 2017, creating the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Effective March 18, 2019, the WMSC is the designated State Safety Oversight Agency for WMATA Metrorail. To learn more about WMSC's oversight role, please visit <https://wmsc.gov/oversight/>.

for operating a federally compliant SSO program. The SSPS is a dynamic document that undergoes annual review and updates to reflect enhancements to the program. This document and its practices are subject to FTA review.

Key Program Activities

Throughout the year, the SSOA's key program activities include:

- Conduct regular work sessions with HRT rail safety, security, operations, and maintenance personnel
- Conduct audits, inspections, and special assessments of HRT's light rail operations
- Review and approve primary HRT rail safety, security, and emergency preparedness plans
- Conduct or adopt rail investigations for accidents, incidents, and hazards occurring on the HRT light rail system
- Track and verify HRT's progress in correcting safety and security gaps on its light rail system

Staffing

The Transit Rail Safety and Emergency Management Administrator (Administrator) oversees DRPT's SSO program and reports directly to the DRPT Director. The Administrator, Andrew Ennis, performs all programmatic decision making and supervisory tasks with the support of contracted consultants. The consultant staff include subject matter experts in the fields of train signaling, engineering, track and structures, rail vehicles, and rail operations. The PTSCTP final rule, 49 CFR Part 672 implements a uniform safety certification training curriculum and requirements for individuals who conduct safety reviews, inspections, examinations, and other safety oversight activities of public transportation systems operated by public transportation agencies and those who are directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation agencies. The DRPT Administrator and consultant staff are compliant with the above-mentioned regulations.

Budget & Funding

The United States Department of Transportation and FTA provide dedicated annual formula grant funding to states with SSO responsibilities. This formula funding is based on the number of rail modes overseen by the state agency and the scale of the RTA's operation – such as track miles, passenger trips, and revenue miles. Grant funds from previous grants can carry forward and SSO's apply for new funds annually. These FTA formula grant funds can be utilized for program administration and activities including but not limited to SSO staff salaries, FTA-mandated training, consultant services, and equipment purchases. In 2024, the DRPT oversight program budget was \$1,154,170. This was comprised of FTA formula grant funds of \$923,336 (80%) that are matched with \$230,834 (20%) from the Commonwealth Mass Transit Fund². DRPT utilizes this funding for various eligible purposes that include:

- Staff salary

² Code of Virginia 33.2-285, 33.2-1526, and Item 433 of Chapter 2 of the 2024 Special Session 1 Acts of Assembly.

- Consultant support
- Routine state safety program activities
- Annual FTA certifications and accredited rail standards training courses
- Dedicated response vehicle
- Equipment needed to perform program activities

Program Highlights from 2024

All SSO program components command equal significance. These program components are designed to be symbiotic, with information and intelligence gathered in one program element informing another. For instance, information gathered in a triennial audit might inform an accident investigation. In the same manner, a finding of cause discovered during an accident investigation might spur closer scrutiny of a certain practice at the RTA, prompting frequent inspections by SSO staff.

Approval of Program Documents

Federal regulation mandates that the SSOA annually review and approve key documents associated with safety and security at the rail transit system. Accordingly, in 2024, DRPT reviewed and approved HRT's Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan Version 8.2 on August 29, 2024.

The PTASP Final Rule, 49 CFR Part 673, requires certain operators of public transportation systems that receive federal funds to develop safety plans that include the processes and procedures to implement safety management systems and safety performance targets. 49 CFR Part 673 also requires an annual review and update of the PTASP. Additionally, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) had numerous implications for SSOAs and RTA safety programs. These requirements are described in greater detail in the "[Federal and State Legislative Changes](#)" section. HRT incorporated all the applicable requirements from the IIJA into its agency safety plan and will be working to incorporate Part 673 revisions during the 2025 update cycle. DRPT formally approved HRT's PTASP, Version 5, on December 19, 2024.

Triennial Audits

One of the mechanisms DRPT utilizes to assess the ongoing health of HRT's rail safety performance is the triennial audit process. Triennial audits gauge the level to which safety is integrated into rail operations, maintenance, training, human resources, procurement, engineering, quality assurance departments, and management structure. All these separate departments, and the organization, support the safe operation of the rail system. The methodology associated with the triennial audits is the continuous and robust assessment of all these departments and their documented efforts at ensuring safety of HRT's passengers and employees. Instead of a single audit of the entire program being conducted once every three years, DRPT conducts this audit on a continual three-year cycle. During these audits, if DRPT concludes that any aspects of HRT's documented programs related to rail safety are not being executed as officially described, DRPT will record these as findings.

Findings are classified as either Findings of Non-Compliance (FNCs) or Findings of Compliance with Recommendations (FCRs). FNCs generally relate to those areas where the RTA is not following federal or state requirements or its own established plans, policies, procedures, or where such documents are nonexistent. FCRs are deficiencies where the RTA has practices or plans

that do not rise to the level of non-compliance with established policies, procedures, or industry standards. Further, they are a preemptive attempt at preventing a low hazard condition from progressing to a situation where it could result in a non-compliance/safety critical issue if unchecked. The RTA is required to address such findings through corrective action plans (CAPs). These CAPs can take the form of recalibrating a program or procedure to better match their practical applications, reinstruction, or instituting new procedures or programs. DRPT reviews and approves all CAPs proposed by HRT and monitors these CAPs to ensure completion within established timeframes.

DRPT conducted two triennial audits of HRT in March and October 2024. Both triennial audits were conducted on-site. HRT submitted documents subject to audit early for review and interviews with HRT personnel were pre-scheduled and conducted.

The March triennial audit assessed HRT's rail transportation program, including implementation of the PTASP, as well as compliance with relevant policies and procedures. This audit resulted in the following FNC and FCRs:

- FNC-1: HRT did not perform a formal review or revision of the rulebook in CY 2022, as required by EXE-101-01.
- FNC-2: The DRPT audit team identified deviations from standard procedures during efficiency testing.
- FCR-1: The PTASP responsibilities matrix was outdated and should have been updated as part of the last PTASP revision.
- FCR-2: HRT Control Center personnel failed to notify Dominion Energy of a downed pole in a timely manner.

The October triennial audit assessed HRT's rail training program, including implementation of the PTASP, as well as compliance with relevant policies and procedures. This audit resulted in the following FCRs:

- FCR-1: There is no formal process to efficiently track compliance with and progress toward achieving set training safety goals throughout the year.
- FCR-2: Upon review of physical training files, DRPT cited missing efficiency check documentation in multiple operator training files. HRT confirmed that the efficiency checks were not completed for the requested months.

DRPT approved proposed CAPs for all the findings listed for both the March and October audits. One of the requirements for a CAP is the RTA must provide an estimated completion date that is both realistic and practical. The estimated completion date should be based on the severity and complexity of the finding the CAP is designed to address. Because of this, it is understood that some CAPs may have a shorter estimated completion period while others may have estimated completion plans that could span several months or years. CAPs with long-term estimated completion dates are acceptable with continued monitoring. A final completion date is assigned when a CAP is verified by the SSO program as ready for closure. As of this writing, the following audit findings and associated corrective actions remain open:

- March 2024 Audit
 - FNC-1: HRT did not perform a formal review or revision of the rulebook in CY 2022, as required by EXE-101-01.
 - FCR-1: The PTASP responsibilities matrix was outdated and should have been updated as part of the last PTASP revision.

- FCR-2: HRT Control Center personnel failed to notify Dominion Energy of a downed pole in a timely manner.
- October 2024 Audit
 - FCR-1: There is no formal process to efficiently track compliance with and progress toward achieving set training safety goals throughout the year.
 - FCR-2: Upon review of physical training files, DRPT cited missing efficiency check documentation in multiple operator training files. HRT confirmed that the efficiency checks were not completed for the requested months.

These corrective actions are actively monitored by DRPT, which will continue to work collaboratively with HRT on resolving open corrective actions. In addition to CAPs from the 2024 triennial audits, DRPT engages with HRT regularly to monitor the progress the closure and verification of CAPs from various sources, including, but not limited to: DRPT inspections, safety events, HRT internal safety reviews, HRT drills or exercises. In 2024, DRPT approved the closure of 39 of HRT's CAPs, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: 2024 HRT CAPs Closed by DRPT.

Inspection Program

The DRPT inspection program is intended as a cooperative effort with HRT to assess the safety and security of operations and maintenance practices. Additionally, it is used to verify overall compliance with federal rules and standards as well as all relevant HRT rules, standards, and procedures on an ongoing basis. The program allows DRPT to:

- Evaluate topics of heightened risk based on recent information, trends, or incidents
- Identify potential problem areas requiring further investigation and solution development
- Assist HRT by providing independent evaluations of procedural and rules compliance
- Gain consistent involvement in HRT operations, maintenance, and safety programs

Inspections typically last one to two days and involve multiple topics and types of observations or reviews, some of them simultaneous. Inspection activities are based on both a regular rotation of subject matter areas as well as areas of heightened risk. Areas of heightened risk are determined through extensive data analysis. Inspection activities can include the following areas of focus:

- Rail Vehicles
- Vehicle Maintenance Facilities and Yards
- Track Access/Roadway Worker Protection
- Traction Power System
- Signal System
- Rail-Highway Grade Crossings
- Operations Control Center
- Rule compliance results provided by HRT

Inspections may be announced or unannounced. For announced inspections, DRPT may provide notice to HRT up to 24 hours before the inspection occurs. If DRPT anticipates an inspection will require specific HRT personnel or preparation, DRPT will provide advance notice to assist with scheduling. For unannounced inspections, DRPT personnel will arrive on the property without advanced notice to HRT. Inspections are conducted from public areas as well as on the Tide right-of-way. Inspections taking place from public areas, such as onboard trains, in stations, or from the street, will not be announced to the HRT personnel performing the operations or maintenance being observed. For any inspections performed on the Tide operating right-of-way, DRPT will provide advanced notification to HRT to ensure coordination and compliance with all HRT right-of-way access and permitting requirements. DRPT oversight program representatives will abide by all HRT safety rules and regulations while on HRT property, including roadway worker protection requirements.

DRPT will publish an inspection report detailing inspection activities after its conclusion. For each inspection, the report will document any observations, violations, potential hazards, deficiencies, and areas for improvement. Unlike the triennial audits, HRT is not required to develop CAPs in response to items in the report unless it is specifically issued by DRPT in an inspection report. However, DRPT strongly encourages HRT to respond to the report and develop CAPs. Even if no deficiencies are identified during an inspection, HRT often proactively addresses inspection items by generating corrective actions or mitigations.

In 2024, DRPT conducted the following inspections:

Month	Activity
January	Station Tactile Warning Strip Conditions
March	Station Conditions, Operations Rules Compliance & Norfolk Tide Facility (NTF) shop
June	Station Conditions
July	Operations Rule Compliance, Track Conditions
October	Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) Event Verification
December	Drug & Alcohol Program

DRPT did not identify or issue any findings during the inspections conducted in 2024. Even if no deficiencies are identified during an inspection, DRPT provides observations, comments, and suggestions to strengthen the HRT's safety program. HRT often proactively addresses these items by generating corrective actions or mitigations and responds to DRPT's inspection memos. The FTA formally certified DRPT's RBI program on December 4, 2024. In 2025, DRPT will continue to refine its RBI program which will include regularly analyzing data submitted by HRT; prioritizing the analyzed data to identify areas of heightened risk; and performing inspections of

the identified areas, as well as complying with implementation requirements per Special Directive 22-49.

Accident Notifications and Investigations

Federal regulation requires rail transit agencies subject to oversight to notify the SSOA and the FTA of accidents that occur on the rail system. During 2024, the FTA defined “accidents” as “an event that involves any of the following: a loss of life; a report of a serious injury to a person; a collision involving a rail transit vehicle; a runaway train; an evacuation for life safety reasons; or any derailment of a rail transit vehicle, at any location, at any time, whatever the cause.” Further, DRPT requires HRT to provide additional notifications of safety events that do not meet the FTA definition for an accident. All event notifications are reported directly to the Administrator within the timeframes prescribed in the SSPS. Please note that as of January 1, 2025, DRPT no longer uses the terms “accident,” “incident,” or “occurrence” and uses the term “safety event” pursuant to changes to 49 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 674.

DRPT is required to investigate all accidents. To conduct these investigations, DRPT may authorize HRT to investigate on its behalf, or DRPT can conduct its own independent investigation. In the event the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FTA, or other federal entity launches an investigation into an HRT light rail accident, DRPT will join the investigative process. DRPT is ultimately responsible for the sufficiency and thoroughness of all investigations, whether conducted by DRPT or HRT. DRPT reviews all investigation reports prepared by HRT for accuracy and adopts each report as its own official investigative report once all DRPT requirements have been met. In 2024, there were **55 safety events** at HRT, as shown in *Figure 2*.




Figure 2: 2024 HRT Accidents by Type.

Several of the events include five collisions involving light rail vehicles and POVs (one of which was reportable to the FTA due to resulting substantial damage); two collisions with objects; three fires; one elevator entrapment; three signal violations at grade crossings; several rule violations by rail Tide operators; several service disruptions, and other events.

The investigations into these accidents concluded:

- Three of the five LRV collisions with POVs were due to actions of the POV drivers; two of the five LRV collisions were due to operating rule violation/human factors.
 - HRT generated two CAPs for collisions with POVs that were due to operating rule violation/human factors; both CAPs were approved for implementation by DRPT in 2024.
- The three fires were found to be non-preventable.
 - Two were brush/mulch fires and one was a fire in the NTF East Yard; all three fires were found to be caused by either passenger or pedestrian actions.
- The three signal violations at grade crossings were found to be preventable.
 - HRT generated three CAPs from the signal violations; the CAPs were approved for implementation and closure by DRPT in 2024.

Of the 55 safety events, the collision with a POV resulting in substantial damage met the criteria for reporting accidents to the FTA. HRT properly reported this event to the FTA. As shown in *Figure 3*, there was a slight increase in the overall total number of safety events in 2024 compared to the previous three years; however, there was also a decrease in the number of FTA reportable events. All investigation reports were reviewed and adopted by the DRPT Administrator.




Figure 3: Comparison of FTA Reportable and DRPT Reportable HRT Safety Events 2021 – 2024.

FTA Actions

Between June 3 to 5, 2024, the FTA conducted its triennial audit of the DRPT SSO program. DRPT submitted all requested documents and participated in on-site audit activities, including interviews and field inspections of the HRT Tide system. The FTA issued its final report to DRPT on October 10, 2024, with the following findings identified:

1. Finding 1: DRPT did not demonstrate its employees, and other personnel are qualified to perform their functions.
 - a. **DRPT SSO Response:** DRPT employees and contractual personnel are qualified to perform their functions, as demonstrated through DRPT's annual submission of its technical training plan (TTP) through the FTA's state safety oversight reporting (SSOR) online tool, as well as through individuals' Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP) certificates
2. Finding 2: DRPT does not electronically submit an annual report with all the requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 674.39(a) to FTA by March 15 or the new deadline if FTA issues an extension.
 - a. **DRPT SSO Response:** DRPT will update Section 1.5 in Revision 17 of its Safety and Security Program Standard and Procedures (SSPS). In this section of the SSPS, DRPT will remove the outdated legal and financial code references identified during the FTA audit. DRPT will upload Revision 17 its SSPS to the State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) online tool by the March 15, 2025, deadline.

At the time of this report, DRPT has generated proposed corrective actions to address these findings in the timeframes prescribed by the FTA and awaits FTA's approval.

Federal and State Legislative Changes

The FTA issued a NPRM for 49 CFR Part 671: Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection with a public comment period from March 25, 2024, to May 24, 2024. This NPRM proposed mandatory minimum standards to prevent safety events for transit workers who need to access the tracks in the service of their work and applies to RTAs covered by the SSO program, SSOAs, and rail transit workers. DRPT informed HRT of the NPRM and public comment period. DRPT also performed a comparative analysis of the 671 NPRM and HRT's current track access program. Following the NPRM, the FTA published the final on December 2, 2024, which sets minimum standards for RWP program elements, including an RWP manual and track access guide; requirements for on-track safety and supervision, job safety briefings, good faith safety challenges, and reporting unsafe acts and conditions and near-misses; development and implementation of risk-based redundant protections for workers; and establishment of RWP training and qualification and RWP compliance monitoring activities.

Additionally in 2024, the FTA published revisions to 49 CFR Part 672: PTSCTP final rule. These revisions were published in August 2024 and went into effect as of November 1, 2024. The revisions to Part 672 include requirement for SSOAs and RTAs to ensure designated personnel and contractors are enrolled within 30 days of designation; the addition of a recertification training element defined by FTA as part of recertification training requirements; clarification of FTA's classification of voluntary participation and what voluntary participation entails; and new administrative requirements for SSOAs and RTAs.

Final revisions to 49 CFR Part 673: PTASP final rule went into effect in May 2024. These revisions include DRPT reviewed HRT's PTASP in compliance in the updated revisions to 49 CFR Part 673, however, did not hold HRT accountable for the new requirements during the 2024 PTASP revision cycle as HRT had already begun to engage its Joint Health & Safety Committee in its PTASP review when the final rule was published. DRPT formally notified HRT that it would work with HRT to ensure that 49 CFR Part 673 revisions are incorporated into HRT's 2025 PTASP, Revision 6, as well as incorporate Part 673 revisions into the DRPT 2025 SSPS.

The FTA published revisions to 49 CFR Part 674: State Safety Oversight final rule in October 2024. DRPT developed a draft of the SSPS Appendix E: Safety Events Requiring Notification to the SSO, which incorporated the appropriate safety event revisions from Part 674 that went into effect on January 1, 2025. In November 2024, DRPT notified and provided HRT with the updated draft of SSPS Appendix E; DRPT also held a virtual workshop in December 2024 with relevant HRT Safety and Operations personnel to ensure adequate understanding of the new safety event reporting criteria and requirements.

Finally, the FTA also issued Safety Advisory 24-2 on November 25, 2024, regarding street-running rail vehicle collisions. As recommended in the Safety Advisory, DRPT issued a notice to HRT on November 26, 2024, requesting that HRT analyze street-running rail collisions through its existing Safety Risk Management process outlined in its PTASP and share the results with DRPT by March 2025. DRPT plans to review and provide the results of the analysis to the FTA per the requested timeframe in the Safety Advisory.